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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY
SHIPMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TO THE THIRD




In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) reported an astonishing statistic-a shipment of toxic
waste crosses a national frontier approximately once every five minutes,
365 days a year.' Between 1986 and 1988, the industrialized nations
shipped over three million tons of hazardous waste to the Third
World. Businesses have powerful economic and legal incentives to
dump their hazardous wastes in developing countries. These incentives
include: severe regulations covering domestic hazardous waste dispo-
sal,3 a greater cost of legal disposal of toxic waste within the nation of
origin than the cost of transportation to and disposal in a developing
nation,4 a shortage of adequate disposal sites within the industrialized
nation,5 and the lack of hazardous waste disposal regulations in Third
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. OECD Adopts New Resolution to Control Transfrontler Movements, 12 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 116 (Mar. 9, 1989) [hereinafter OECD Adopts New Resolution].
2. J. VALLETTE, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WAsTEs: A GREENPEACE INVEN-
TORY 7 (1989).
3. See infra notes 26-112 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive regula-
tions of the European Community, the OECD, and the United States).
4. See Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International
Legal Controls, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,171, 10,171 n.3 (1989) (estimating the amount
of savings to be approximately $75 per ton).
5. See Wassermann, Attempts at Control Over Toxic Waste, 15 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 410, 410 (1981) (describing the problems of toxic waste in several industrialized
countries); Italy Moves to Resolve Problem with Nigeria on Dumping of Toxic Waste,
11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 379 (July 13, 1988) [hereinafter Italy Resolves Problem
with Nigeria] (stating that only ten percent of the approximate five million tons of
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World nations.6 Indeed, the hazardous waste industry has evolved into
a lucrative business.7
Within the last several years, however, internal and external pres-
sures8 have forced industrialized nations to reconsider their domestic
regulations and international agreements concerning the transfrontier
shipment of hazardous waste to developing countries. 9 Consequently,
beginning with the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm (Stockholm Convention)10 and concluding
Italian toxic wastes can be disposed of in Italy); Handley, supra note 4, at 10,171
(describing how economies of scale may foster the export of toxic wastes). For exam-
ple, Greece, Luxembourg, and Denmark cannot build complex disposal sites due to
their small size. Id. at 10,171-72. Topographical and geological factors may '!Iso pre-
vent nations from building adequate disposal facilities. Id. at 10,172; see also Com-
ment, International Regulation of Transfrontier Hazardous Waste Shipments: A New
EEC Environmental Directive, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 85, 86 (1985) [hereinafter Com-
ment, International Regulation] (discussing the numerous reasons for the transfrontier
movements of hazardous wastes from industrialized nations to the Third World).
6. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,171 (stating that developing countries lack
experience regarding the disposal of industrial hazardous byproducts).
7. See Main & Fromsom, Who Will Clean Up by Cleaning Up, FORTUNE, Mar.
17, 1986, at 96 (estimating that the toxic waste industry may be worth approximately
$300 billion).
8. See Marshall, West Europe Has Its Fill of Toxic Waste, L.A. Times, Feb. 28,
1989, at I (retelling the story of the Karin B, the Italian ship which searched for a port
in which to dispose of its 2,000 tons of waste, only to be rejected and sent back to
Italy); see also J. VALLErTE, supra note 2, at 11 (recounting the journey of the Khian
Sea, a ship carrying 13,476 tons of incinerator ash from Philadelphia to Haiti, where it
was rejected). The Khian Sea subsequently sailed to Yugoslavia, changed its name to
the Felicia and attempted to port in fifteen different countries. Id. at 13. After each
nation rejected Felicia, the ship appeared off the coast of Singapore-without any ash
and with a new name-the Pelicano. Id.; see also Outcry Grows in Africa over West's
Waste-Dumping, Wash. Post, June 22, 1988, at A15 [hereinafter Outcry Grows] (dis-
cussing Third World nations' recent anger and frustration over the increase in toxic
waste disposal contracts between many industrialized and developing countries).
9. See generally Handley, supra note 4, at 10,171 (discussing the past and current
efforts of the United States and European Community to regulate the transboundary
shipment of toxic wastes); Rublack, Controlling Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Waste: The Evolution Of A Global Convention, 13 FLETCHER F. 113 (1989)
(summarizing international agreements, including the development of the United Na-
tions Draft Convention); Helfenstein, U.S. Controls on International Disposal of Haz-
ardous Waste, 22 INT'L LAW. 775 (1988) (discussing the development of the efforts of
the United States to control the extraterritorial disposal of toxic waste); Note, Prior
Informed Consent: An Emerging Compromise for Hazardous Exports, 21 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 365 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Prior Informed Consent] (discussing various
international agreements which have adopted prior informed consent procedures);
Comment, International Regulation, supra note 5, at 85 (comparing the European
Community's directives with the efforts of the United States and OECD to control the
toxic waste exports).
10. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and
Corr. 1 (1972), U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corr., reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972) [hereinafter U.N. Conference on the Human Environment]; see infra notes
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with the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Conven-
tion)," industrialized nations' attitudes, positions, and international ne-
gotiations have changed dramatically. Developing nations that once ac-
cepted the dumping of industrialized nations' toxic wastes12 in
exchange for the economic benefits the industrialized nations provided 3
today are vehemently opposed to the importation of hazardous wastes."
Moreover, industrialized nations have recognized the moral,' politi-
cal,' and environmental17 implications of exporting toxic wastes to de-
veloping nations.
Today, several national, regional, and international' 8 agreements ex-
ist, which restrict the transboundary shipment of toxic wastes. Al-
though vastly improved in comparison to their predecessors, these
113-32 and accompanying text (tracing the history of the Basel Convention).
11. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, adopted and opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, re-
printed in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, BASEL CONVENTION ON
THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR
DISPOSAL: FINAL ACT [hereinafter BASEL CONVENTION), also reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
649 (1989).
12. See Africa: The Wastebasket of the West, 67 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 48, 48-50
(1988) [hereinafter Africa: The Wastebasket] (discussing the various African countries
that have accepted toxic wastes from developed countries). The West African nation of
Guinea-Bissau, for example, has reportedly agreed to import three million tons of Eu-
ropean waste each year for five years, potentially earning S150-S600 million. Id. at 48.
Guinea-Bissau has an annual gross national product worth approximately SISO million.
Id.
13. See Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing
Countries: A Political Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281, 282 (1981) (stating that
developing countries consider the control of global pollution within their own barriers
irrevelant compared to the crucial economic problems they face). Indeed, according to
Sri Lanka's United Nations ambassador during the 1970s, Third World nations would
be willing to accept one hundred percent of the developed nations' toxic wastes and the
associated risks in exchange for the opportunity to industrialize their economies. Id. at
282 n.2.
14. See Africa: The Wastebasket, supra note 12, at 49 (discussing an Organization
of African Unity (OAU) member's description of disposal of hazardous waste in Africa
as an "attack on Africa's dignity").
15. See infra note 53 (stating various testimony of Senators regarding the unethical
practice of hazardous waste dumping in developing countries).
16. See Italy Resolves Problem with Nigeria, supra note 5, at 379 (stating that
Nigeria discovered 2,000 tons of illegal Italian wastes in southern Nigeria). Conse-
quently, Nigeria severed diplomatic ties with Italy. Id.
17. See Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 788 (noting that the improper disposal of
toxic wastes can harm not only the host country, but also nearby countries sharing the
air or water).
18. See infra notes 26-146 and accompanying text (discussing resolutions adopted
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), European Community
(EC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)).
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agreements lack the crucial elements necessary to satisfy all parties in-
volved.19 Indeed, it appears that the industrialized and developing na-
tions have reached an impasse.2 0 As a result, many nations hope the
Basel Convention will be the most far reaching and comprehensive in-
ternational agreement to date.21
This Comment examines existing national and international laws and
agreements regulating the transfrontier shipments of hazardous waste,
focusing on the Basel Convention as the latest attempt at resolution.
Part II presents a brief overview of the United States Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA) to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA), 2 the European Community (EC or
the Community) Directive on Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous
Waste,2 3 and the OECD Decision and Recommendation on Trans-
frontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes. 24 Part III discusses the Ba-
sel Convention's final adoptions, comparing them to the United Nations
Environment Programme's Draft Conventions on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes.2 5 Part IV sets forth rec-
ommendations concerning the solution to the dilemma of transportation
of hazardous waste, and Part V provides conclusory remarks.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 160-99 and accompanying text (noting that despite the ratifica-
tion of the Basel Convention, developing countries and industrialized nations continue
to disagree on fundamental objectives and key provisions).
21. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11.
22. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98
Stat. 3221 (1984), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91) [hereinafter
HSWA]; see infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f)
which specifically addresses the export of hazardous wastes, including bilateral agree-
ments between the United States and other countries).
23. Council Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European Com-
munity of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 326) 31 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Directive], amended by 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 181) 13 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Amendment].
24. Decision and Recommendation on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous
Wastes, OECD Doc. C(83)180 (Feb. 13, 1984), reprinted in TRANSFRONTIER MOVE-
MENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 13 (1985) [hereinafter 1984 Final Decision], also re-
printed in 25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986).
25. Second Revised Draft Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes, UNEP/WG.182/3 (June 1988); Third Revised Draft Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, UNEP/WG.186/3
(June 1988).
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I. INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF TRANSFRONTIER
MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
A. THE UNITED STATES
1. Historical Development
In 1969, the United States passed the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA) in an effort to establish environmental protection poli-
cies.2 6 Because NEPA does not apply extraterritorially," however,
President Carter issued Executive Order No. 12,264 which established,
inter alia, procedures for the export of hazardous substances.2 Al-
though President Reagan revoked Order No. 12,264 in 1981,29 RCRA
had been passed in 1980.30
Initially, RCRA only established regulations regarding domestic
generation, treatment, transport, storage, and disposal of solid wastes.31
Consequently, factors such as the increase in the domestic generation
of toxic waste 32 and disposal costs,3 3 the decrease in the number and
26. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
27. See United States v. Catz Am. Co., 53 F.2d 425, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1931) (stat-
ing that a product banned by both an exporter and importer can still be exported). The
importing nation, however, has the responsibility to make the product comply with its
domestic laws. Id. at 426; see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (construed in Helfenstein,
supra note 9, at 777) (stating that the environmental impacts of nuclear exports on a
foreign nation should not be considered under NEPA); Conservation Council v. Alumi-
num Co., 518 F. Supp. 270, 274-76 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that no jurisdiction
existed to stop a mining project in Australia on the grounds of environmental harm);
Galli, Hazardous Exports to the Third World: The Need to Abolish the Double Stan-
dard, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 71 (1987) (examining the difficulties of applying the
law of the United States extraterritorially).
28. Exec. Order No. 12,264, 46 Fed. Reg. 4,659 (1981). This order sets forth
guidelines regarding the export of banned or significantly restricted substances. Id.; see
Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 778-9 (addressing Executive Order No. 12,264 as using
notification and reporting requirements in addition to the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stance Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-76 (1988), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2604-06 (1988), which regulate both hazardous and chemical substances).
29. Exec. Order No. 12,290, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,943 (1981) construed in Helfenstein,
supra note 9, at 779.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982).
31. Id.
32. See Porterfield & Weir, The Export of U.S. Toxic Wastes, NATION, Oct. 3,
1987, at 341 (stating that the amount of toxic waste produced in the United States is
continually rising). According to the General Accounting Office, the volume of toxic
waste produced increased from 9 to 247 million metric tons from 1970 to 1984. Id.; see
also Handley, supra note 4, at 10,171 n.1 (stating that in 1985, the Chemical Manu-
facturer's Association approximated that the United States generated 212 million tons
of toxic waste per year). The Office of Technology Assessment, however, estimated that
the United States produces 575 million tons of hazardous waste each year. Id.
33. See Porterfield & Weir, supra note 32, at 341 (stating that the cost of disposal
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capacity of domestic disposal sites,34 and the public opposition to the
location of disposal sites known as "Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY)
compelled American businesses to view exportation of toxic wastes as a
viable alternative. As a result, pressures from environmental interest
groups and several foreign policy embarrassments 3 compelled Con-
gress to address the exportation of hazardous waste and pass the
HSWA to RCRA in 1984.36
Pursuant to HSWA, the exporter must notify the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) of its proposed shipment of haz-
ardous waste37 to another country. Within thirty days thereafter, the
EPA and the State Department must inform the importing government
that the law of the United States prohibits the exportation of hazard-
ous waste without consent from the importing nation.38 Following the
receipt of consent or objection from the importing nation, the EPA
must notify the exporter within thirty days.39 HSWA also requires that
the primary exporter report annually to the EPA a summary of the
in 1976 was approximately $10 per ton; however, by 1987, the cost ranged from $60 to
over $140 per ton); Postel, Defusing the Toxics Threat: Controlling Pesticides and
Industrial Waste, in WORLDWATCH PAPER 79, 41 (1987) (stating that landfill prices
have increased to $240 per ton since the early 1970s and organic waste incineration in
1987 cost between $500 and $1,200 per ton).
34. See Pollock, Mining Urban Wastes: The Potential for Recycling, in
WORLDWATCH PAPER 76, 15 (1987) (stating that according to the Institute for Local
Self Reliance, over 50% of American cities will deplete their current landfills by
1990).
35. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing recent stories of international and
Third World opposition to toxic waste dumping); see also Note, Prior Informed Con-
sent, supra note 9, at 376 n.64 (stating that the United States State Department feared
that the United States would be accused of "dumping its waste in the black man's
backyard"); J. VALLETTE, supra note 2, at 17-91 (reporting a vast number of past,
present, and pending schemes regarding the exportation of hazardous wastes).
36. HWSA, supra note 22; see Background and Summary of Final Rule, 51 Fed.
Reg. 28,664 (1986), codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-63, 271 (1988) (reviewing the 1984
amendment to RCRA (HSWA) as well as promulgating the provisions regulating the
export of toxic wastes).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(a)-(b) (1988). Notification must be in writing, signed by
the primary exporter, and include a description of: (1) the waste, (2) the estimated
frequency of export of the waste, (3) the estimated total quantity, (4) points where the
waste will enter and depart from each foreign country, (5) the method of transporta-
tion, (6) the manner in which the waste will be treated, stored, or disposed of in the
importing country, (7) the name and address of the final receiver, and (8) the name of
any of the transit countries. Id. at 262.53(a)(i)-(vii).
38. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(c) (1988); see Handley, supra note 4, at 10,173 n.37 (stat-
ing that after the State Department receives the information within the notice of intent
from the EPA Office of International Activities, it cables the information to the import-
ing country). The embassy then submits a translated version to the importing nation's
appropriate environmental agency. Id. Once the importing nation consents or objects,
the process is reversed. Id.
39. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(f) (1988).
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types, quantities, frequency, and final destinations of all toxic wastes
exported during the previous year.40 HSWA's specific notification, con-
sent, and annual report provisions are waived if the United States and
the importing government have a formal bilateral agreement regarding
the transfer of toxic waste.4
HSWA broadly defines "hazardous wastes" as substances that cause
significant illnesses, an increase in mortality, or harm to individuals'
health or to the environment. 2 Accordingly,'the EPA has listed specific
solid wastes and characteristics of waste that HSWA regulates. 3 Con-
cerning liability, however, HSWA lacks the requisite clear legislative
intent to enable it to have extraterritorial effect. 4 Although private cit-
izens and the United States government may bring suit regarding the
noncompliance of HSWA's notification and consent requirements, for-
eign nations can only seek redress through the American tort system
when imported toxic wastes cause injury within their borders .4
2. Inadequacies
Although HSWA reflects the commitment and responsibility of the
United States to control the exportation of hazardous wastes, it lacks
adequate enforcement mechanisms. Generally, HSWA is poorly imple-
mented due to the inefficient coordination between the EPA and the
United States Customs Service,"6 as well as the inadequate resources of
both government agencies.4 More particularly, the lack of specificity in
the notice of intent provision concerning what information the exporter
40. 40 C.F.R. § 262.56(a) (1988).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (Supp. V 1987). The United States currently has interna-
tional agreements with Canada and Mexico. Rublack, supra note 9, at 116. Deviating
from the EPA's notification-consent requirement, the treaty states that if Canada does
not object to the notice of intent within thirty days, consent is implied. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982).
43. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)-(c) (1988) (defining solid waste); see 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-
.24 (1988) (stating that a solid waste is considered a hazardous waste if it exhibits any
of the following four characteristics: corrosivity, ignitability, reactivity, or toxicity).
44. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,174 n.56 (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281 (1949)) (discussing the need for legislative intent if the law is to have an
extraterritorial effect).
45. Handley, supra note 4, at 10,174.
46. See EPA's Program on Hazardous Waste Exports Needs Improvements, In-
spector General Says, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 434 (Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter
EPA's Program Needs Improvements] (denoting the inadequate control of toxic waste
exports due to the insufficient communication between the Customs Service and the
EPA).
47. See Porterfield & Weir, supra note 32, at 341 (noting EPA enforcement official
Gary Steakley's discussion of the consistent lack of funding for enforcement).
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must provide48 and the ambiguity in the definition of hazardous
waste49 further detract from proper implementation of HSWA. In ad-
dition, HSWA does not contain provisions which require an exporter to
receive the prior consent of transit countries through which toxic
wastes may travel, 50 nor prohibit exportation if reason exists to believe
that inadequate disposal is occurring.51 Finally, the lack of detailed ob-
ligations concerning liability52 creates large loopholes within HSWA.
On May 31, 1989, Congressman Synar, a Democrat from Oklahoma,
and Congressman Conyers, a Democrat from Missouri, introduced the
Waste Export Control Act of 1989.11 The bill includes: first, a require-
48. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,174 n.63 (citing EPA, PROGRAM TO CON-
TROL EXPORTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, Audit Report No. EID37-05-04560-80855, at
14 (1988)) (stating that exporters often give insufficient information regarding the han-
dling and disposal of the hazardous waste in their notices of intent). Indeed, there have
been cases in which exports of toxic wastes have occurred without any notice of intent.
EPA's Program Needs Improvements, supra note 46, at 434.
49. See EPA Adopts New Enforcement Strategy to Curb Illegal Exports of Haz-
ardous Waste, I1 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 274 (May 11, 1988) [hereinafter EPA
Adopts New Strategy] (discussing sham recycling, methods by which generators or
handlers classify waste as recyclable to avoid HSWA regulations). The regulations also
exempt recycled waste, such as commercial chemical materials that are to be re-
claimed. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1988). The EPA has further determined that certain toxic
wastes defined in state regulations should not be included in HSWA's provisions. 40
C.F.R. § 261 (1988).
50. Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 782. Although the exporter must notify any
transit country of the shipment of hazardous waste, the transit country's prior consent
is not a prerequisite of exportation. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(e)-(f) (1988). EPA requires
prior consent only for a country "which is actually ending up with the waste whether
through disposal, treatment or long-term storage," not one in which "mere transporta-
tion through or temporary storage incidental to transportation" would occur. Id. at
28,666-67. However, EPA did not place a time limit on the length of "temporary"
storage vis-a-vis "ultimate" storage. Id. at 28,672.
51. Handley, supra note 4, at 10,181; see U.S. Would Tie Waste Exports to Bilat-
eral Agreements, Thomas Says, I 1 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 472 (Sept. 1988) (discuss-
ing how the United States favors "a basic presumption" that it would not export waste
if a Third World country opposed importation or an inadequate mechanism existed for
handling or disposal of the waste).
52. HSWA, supra note 22, at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (stating that although HSWA
does provide criminal penalties for knowingly exporting toxic wastes without the prior
consent of the importing nation or in contravention of an agreement between the
United States and the importer, an exporter's liability does not extend to personal
injury).
53. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989). The bill was introduced in the House
Government Operations Subcommittee on Environment, Energy & Natural Resources.
Id.; see Handley, supra note 4, at 10,181 (stating that an interagency working group,
representing the EPA and the State Department, met at the end of President Reagan's
second term). The working group recommended two possibilities to modify the 1986
amendment under this bill: (1) an increase in information supplied to the importing
country, including the domestic disposal requirements of the United States, and (2) a
ban on hazardous waste export, except with regard to any bilateral agreement between
the United States and the importing nation. Id. Because the United States Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), however, considered the transboundary movement of
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ment that the importing nation handles the toxic waste in as strict a
fashion as the United State ; second, a waste minimization screening
procedure that compels an exporter to make "reasonable efforts" to
halt the generation of the waste; third, a waste export permit mecha-
nism; and, fourth, an expansion of the Superfund liability system."
The bill, however, does not define "reasonable efforts" and does not
include a provision that would enable the United States to halt exports
of waste that are found not to be handled in an environmentally sound
manner.55 The Bush administration is supporting other draft legislation
that does not contain the "as strict as" language.50 Instead, an exporter
would be permitted to transport toxic wastes only if the developing na-
tion could manage the waste in an "environmentally sound manner.1
57
B. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
1. Historical Development
The Treaty of Rome5 " established the EC in 1957,09 but did not ex-
hazardous waste to be a "free-market" issue which should be limited to agreements
between businesses and government, Congress never acted on the recommendation. Id.
at 10,182; see also U.S. Congress Considers Limiting Waste Exports, GREENPEACE
WASTE TRADE UPDATE, July 15, 1989, at 4 [hereinafter GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE
UPDATE] (analyzing House Report 2525 from the 101st Congress in 1989).
54. GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 4-5; see House Bill
Outlines Strict Standards for Limiting Hazardous Waste Export, 13 INSIDE EPA
WEEKLY REP., July 14, 1989, at 7 (restating the tougher requirements demanded by
the Synar and Conyers legislation).
55. GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973
G.R. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
59. European Communities Commission, TREATIES ESTABUSHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, (1983) [hereinafter TREATIES], at 23. The EC is presently composed of
twelve member nations: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EN-
VIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, 1967-1987 (1987) [hereinafter EC ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION], at i. Institutionally, the EC is divided into four main bodies: the Com-
mission, the Council, the Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. TREATIES,
supra, at 23. The Commission, consisting of seventeen Commissioners who the Com-
munity chooses, has the power to propose legislation and represent the interest of the
EC. Id. at 25. The Council is the EC's main legislative branch and consists of one
representative minister from each nation; moreover, the Council has the power to act
upon the Commission's proposals. Id. at 36. The Commission meets once a week while
the Council gathers twice a year. EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra, at i-ii.
Members of the Parliament, elected every four years by the citizens of each nation, are
divided into political groupings rather than groups designated by nationality. Id. at iii.
The Parliament primarily functions as an advisory body. TREATIES, supra, at 32. With
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pressly address environmental issues. The EC, like the United States,
eventually became aware of the need to formulate internal environmen-
tal policies. Accordingly, the Community initiated a series of Environ-
mental Action Progammes6 ° as well as legislation addressing environ-
mental issues."' As the Community generated more waste,62 however,
member states were confronted with the increasing cost of disposal as
well as a decreasing number of adequate disposal sites.63 Because of
these emerging problems, member states began to export hazardous
wastes to other member nations and to developing countries.
64
Propelled by the Seveso disaster in 1976,65 however, the EC adopted
the Directive on the Transfrontier Movement of Toxic Waste in 1984
(1984 Directive).66 The 1984 Directive requires that exporters give
the advent of the Single European Act, however, in limited instances the Council can-
not act without the Parliament's consent. EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra, at
iii. The Court of Justice's thirteen appointed judges decide cases brought between the
EC institutions, the member states and the Commission, and by individuals against
member nations or the Commission. TREATIES, supra, at 39-42.
60. See EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra note 59, at vi (noting that the
EC has presently adopted four such programs during the following time periods: (1)
1973-77, (2) 1977-82, (3) 1982-86, and (4) 1987-92); Fourth Environment Action Pro-
gramme, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 328) 6 (1987) [hereinafter Fourth Environment
Action Program] (noting the four EC environmental programs). Applying the Fourth
Environment Action Program, the EC intends to focus its efforts on implementation of
EC legislation by member nations. EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra note 59,
at vi; see also Geddes, 1992 and the Environment--Sovereignty Well Lost?, New L.J.,
Nov. 11, 1988, at 826 (discussing how the Fourth Environment Action Program ele-
vates environmental issues to a central position on the EC agenda).
61. See Fourth Environment Action Program, supra note 60, at 7 (noting that the
Single European Act, as amending the Treaty of Rome, reflects the EC's pursuit of
environmental protection). Title VII of the Single European Act, through Articles
130R to 130T, focuses on preventive action and the protection and improvement of the
quality of the environment. Id.; see also EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra note
59, at 1.1-6 (providing a brief overview of past EC legislation regarding the environ-
ment); Comment, International Regulation, supra note 5, at 96 (describing how trans-
portation of toxic wastes between member nations was once based on ad hoc bilateral
agreements).
62. Handley, supra note 4, at 10,171 (estimating that the EC generates approxi-
mately 30 million metric tons of waste each year).
63. Rublack, supra note 9, at 115.
64. Comment, International Regulation, supra note 5, at 96 (stating that approxi-
mately ten to fifteen percent of EC hazardous waste is disposed outside of the generat-
ing country).
65. Id. at 95 (noting that the removal of hazardous waste was required after a
chemical factory in Seveso, Italy exploded). In 1983, 41 barrels of Seveso waste were
found hidden in France after having entered the country undetected. Id.; see O'Connor,
Issues Involved in Draft Proposal for Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused
by Waste Examined, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 540 (Oct. 14, 1987) (referring to the
1984 Directive as the "Seveso 2").
66. 1984 Directive, supra note 23; see EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra
note 59, at iv (stating that the 1984 Directive takes its authority from the Treaty of
Rome in which article 100 gives authority to the Council to pass directives affecting
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prior notice to the competent authorities within the member state67
when hazardous waste is shipped to another member state, to nonmem-
ber states, or from a nonmember state to a Community member state. 8
When the competent authorities acknowledge receipt of the notifica-
tion,69 a shipment accompanied by the uniform consignment note may
proceed. 0 The 1984 Directive requires each member state to file a re-
port every two years regarding all exports of hazardous wastes.71 The
EC Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste of 1978 (1978 Directive)
defines hazardous waste.72 Although the 1978 Directive sets forth a list
of toxic substances, each member state must ultimately legislate the
nature, quantities, and concentrations of toxic wastes which constitute
a danger to the environment.7 3 Furthermore, member states may desig-
member nations, and article 235 allows the Council to address objectives). Id.; Lutz,
The Export of Danger: A View from the Developed World, 20 INT'L L. & PoL. 629,
651 n.75 (1988) (reviewing briefly articles 100 and 235). The EC Council uses direc-
tives to harmonize members' national laws and regulations. Id. at 652 n.79. The Treaty
of Rome, however, failed to provide the Council with the specific power of implementa-
tion. Id.; see also Anderson, Inadequate Implementation of EEC Directives: A Road-
block on the Way to 1992?, 11 B.C. Ir'L & Cobip. L. REV. 91, 91 (1988) (noting
that according to article 189 of the Treaty of Rome, directives are binding upon each
member nation); But see EC Rules on Waste Exports Often Ignored, Ministers Disa-
gree on Tightening Standards, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 375 (July 13, 1988) [herein-
after EC Rules Often Ignored] (stating that individual EC countries often ignore the
EC legislation controlling the export of toxic wastes); Lutz, supra, at 652 n.79 (discuss-
ing that because member nations are permitted to choose the forms and methods of
implementing a directive, instances of inefficient and inadequate legislation on the part
of EC members arise); Shackleton, The Politics of Fishing in Britain and France:
Some Lessons for Community Integration, 9 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 29, 29 (1985)
(stating that differences in economic priorities and policies between two member na-
tions may reveal the reasons for broadly worded directives).
67. 1984 Directive, supra note 23, art. 3(2), at 33 (stating that notification is made
through the use of a "uniform consignment note").
68. Id. art. 3(1), at 33. The notice must include information on:
the source and composition of the waste.., the provisions made for routes and
insurance against damage to third parties, the measures taken for safe transit
and . . . compliance by the carrier with any conditions laid down by the
[m]ember [s]tates concerned ... and existence of a contractual agreement with
the consignee. . . who should possess adequate technical capacity for the disposal
of the waste.
Id. art. 3, at 33. The consignee is defined as the party "to whom the waste is shipped
for disposal." Id. art. 2, at 33.
69. 1984 Directive, supra note 23, art. 4(b), at 34 (stating that authorities have 15
days to request that the exporter comply with conditions).
70. Handley, supra note 4, at 10,175.
71. 1984 Directive, supra note 23, art. 13(1), at 35. Each report must contain ir-
regularities in the transport of waste, and a description of the quantity and type of
waste that has been generated and exported, as well as received. Id.
72. EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, supra note 59, at 111.6.
73. Comment, International Regulation, supra note 5, at 99; see O'Connor, supra
note 65, at 541 (noting that permitting member nations to define waste often results in
inconsistent national laws).
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nate border crossing points through which the hazardous waste must
pass.74
In 1986, the EC Council amended the. 1984 Directive (1986 Amend-
ment).7 5 The 1986 Amendment improved the 1984 Directive by requir-
ing every exporter to obtain the agreement of the receiving nonmember




Both the 1984 Directive and the 1986 Amendment, however, lack
provisions that expressly delineate liability obligations, 77 or require ex-
porters to have insurance.78 Moreover, inadequate specificity of the
1984 Directive and 1986 Amendment on what constitutes hazardous
waste has resulted in either insufficient or inconsistent national laws.70
This ambiguity in definition presents problems for the exporters and
dangerous consequences for Third World transit and importing
countries."
In addition, a number of EC member states have not implemented
74. 1984 Directive, supra note 23, art. 9, at 35.
75. 1986 Amendment, supra note 23, at 13.
76. Id. art. 3(4), at 14.
77. See 1984 Directive and 1986 Amendment, supra note 23 (noting the absence of
any liability provision); O'Connor, supra note 65, at 540 (stating that in 1987, it ap-
peared that products liability was considered inapplicable to hazardous waste). But see
Handley, supra note 4, at 10,176 (discussing article 11 of the 1984 Directive in which
products liability was being considered as applicable to hazardous wastes); Commission
Proposes 'Polluter Pays' Rule for Recovering Environmental Damage Costs, 12 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 379 (Aug. 9, 1989) (discussing the EC's new proposal which would
hold producers of toxic waste strictly liable for any damages resulting from the waste).
The new proposal attempts to harmonize legislation within the EC, provide an incentive
to invest in clean technologies, and encourage the minimization of waste generation. Id.
Although it also constructs a separate category of liability for damage to the environ-
ment, the new proposal restricts coverage to "major and persistent" environmental
damage, prohibits the imposition of punitive damages, and limits legal action to public
authorities. Id.
78. See Comment, International Regulation, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that the
1984 Directive only grants member nations an opportunity to inquire into insurance
coverage); see also Proposal for a Council Directive on Hazardous Waste, 31 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 295) 4 (1988) (discussing that although the 1984 Directive in-
structed the Council to propose an insurance provision by September 1988, the 1988
Proposal does not address insurance); O'Connor, supra note 65, at 542 (stating that the
working party on civil liability considered the insurance question to be a political rather
than a legal issue).
79. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (discussing the member nations'
inadequate implementation of EC directives).
80. See Comment, International Regulation, supra note 5, at 100 (noting that due
to different definitions of waste, confusion may arise when a shipment of hazardous
waste involves more than one member nation).
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any legislation controlling the exportation of toxic waste to developing
countries pursuant to the 1984 Directive and 1986 Amendment.,1 This
fact reflects an underlying defect in the entire EC institutional struc-
ture.82 However, in December 1989, during negotiations for the Lome
IV Convention8 3 the EC agreed to ban all hazardous waste exports to
sixty-eight African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations (ACP).
C. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
1. Historical Development
In 1974, the OECD85 established the Waste Management Policy
Group (the Group) 6 to address international waste problems on three
fronts: first, source reduction; second, material reclamation; and, third,
transportation and disposal of toxic waste.87 In 1984, however, the
OECD focused exclusively on the transfrontier movement of toxic
waste when it adopted the Decision and Recommendation on Trans-
frontier Movements of Hazardous Waste (1984 Final Decision). 83 The
81. See J. VALLETrE, supra note 2, at 114 (noting that only Greece, Belgium, and
Denmark have implemented the 1984 Directive and the 1986 Amendment into national
law); Humphrey, Effective Supervision of Community Law: Liability of Governments,
Swiss REV. INT'L COMPErITION L. 81, 82 (1984) (observing that it is common for
more than two years to pass before an EC member nation implements a judgment from
the Court of Justice); see also EC Rules Often Ignored, supra note 66, at 375 (discuss-
ing a scheme which passed off highly toxic waste as safe industrial chemicals in an
illegal agreement between an Italian businessman and a Nigerian laborer).
82. See Easson, The Court of Justice of the European Communities: Jurispru-
dence During 1985, 10 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 79, 79 (1986) (noting that of the 113
cases brought before the Court of Justice in 1984, 74 of the cases concerned the failure
to implement EC directives).
83. GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Dec. 1989, at 2 [hereinafter UPDATE]
(noting that the Lome Convention focuses on trade and development aid between the
EC and ACP).
84. Id; see GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 4 (discussing
the prior agreement in principle reached between the EC and ACP); Id. (noting that
the ACP nations disagreed on the EC's proposed exceptions to the ban on waste
exportation).
85. Lutz, supra note 66, at 654 n.88 (stating that the OECD is exclusively com-
posed of industrialized democracies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
86. Rublack, supra note 9, at 119.
87. Id.; see OECD Nations Agree to Strict Controls on Hazardous Waste Exports
to Non-Members, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 238 (July 9, 1986) [hereinafter OECD
Nations Agree] (noting that OECD member countries were confronted with the grow-
ing problem of waste disposal both within each member's borders as well as between
OECD countries).
88. 1984 Final Decision, supra note 24; see Hannenquart, The Responsibilities of
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1984 Final Decision required member nations to notify the countries
involved of any transboundary movement of hazardous waste. 9
The OECD also recommended principles for member nations to fol-
low in the implementation of the 1984 Final Decision. First, any party
involved in the export of toxic waste must obtain authority from the
nations of origin, transit, and final destination." Second, the nation of
generation must apply its domestic laws of toxic waste exportation as
stringently to exports as to domestic movements. 91 Third, the exporter
must provide the exporting, transit, and importing nations with ade-
quate and timely information regarding the origin, composition, and
quantities of waste; any environmental risks involved in transport; the
conditions of carriage; and the identity of all parties.92 Fourth, an im-
porter may object to a toxic waste shipment if the objection is in accor-
dance with its own domestic law.93 Fifth, if the importer cannot com-
plete safe disposal, the generator must reassume responsibility for the
waste, or alternatively, reimport it.94
The OECD improved the 1984 Final Decision by adopting the Deci-
sion-Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes in 1986 (1986
Export Decision).95 In addition to the notification requirements im-
posed on exporting countries, the 1986 Export Decision requires mem-
ber nations to prohibit exports unless the importing nation consents to
the Competent Authorities in Regard to the Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous
Wastes, in TRANSFRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 23-29 (1985) (analyz-
ing the various obligations of governments working to control the transboundary ship-
ment of toxic wastes under the decisions of the EC, OECD, and UNEP); Helfenstein,
supra note 9; at 780 n.52 (noting that although OECD decisions are binding on mem-
ber nations, they obligate only those nations that approve of the decision). Decisions
must also comply with each approving nation's domestic constitutional procedures. Id.;
Lutz, supra note 66, at 654 (stating that although OECD recommendations are non-
binding, they strongly influence the international legal community).
89. Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 785; see 1984 Final Decision, supra note 24, at 15
(noting that the 1984 Decision requires member nations to ensure that the competent
authorities of the countries concerned receive adequate and timely information).
90. 1984 Final Decision, supra note 24, at 14.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id. at 5.1, 5.2.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id. at 3; see Depuy, International Law Measure to Implement the Principles in
the OECD Decision on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste, in TRANS-
FRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 39 (1985) (discussing the content and
implications of the 1984 Final Decision and the measures that member countries need
to take for implementation).
95. Handl, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World Countries:
Common Destiny-Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 603, 617 n.50
(1988) (citing Council Decision-Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes
from the OECD Area, OECD Doe. C(86)64 I(iii) (June 5, 1986) [hereinafter 1986
Export Decision]).
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the exports.96 Furthermore, an OECD member country must provide
prior notification to any transit country involved.0 Finally, according to
the 1986 Export Decision, a member nation must ensure that the im-
porting country has adequate disposal facilities."
2. Present Status
Because the 1984 Final Decision and the 1986 Export Decision ne-
glected to resolve several key issues,9 the OECD decided to make im-
provements and aimed to finalize a draft law in time for the Basel Con-
vention. 00 Because several parties usually collect, treat, and handle the
waste, the Group debated the proper definition of "exporter.""1 It con-
sidered the type and extent of notification that the exporting country
must provide to the importing country.10 2 Further debate focused on
the issue of whether consent from transit countries should be required
prior to the shipment of toxic waste,10 3 as well as the general issue of
liability.10 4 The Group also addressed the issue of whether "bona fide"
96. Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 785.
97. Id.; see OECD Nations Agree, supra note 87, at 238 (discussing the OECD
1986 Export Decision).
98. Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 785.
99. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing the variety of issues
the Waste Management Policy Group has debated).
100. See OECD Adopts New Waste Resolution to Control Transfrontier Move-
ments, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 116 (Mar. 1989) (discussing the waste control reso-
lution that the OECD prepared for the Basel Convention); see also Resolution of the
Council on Control of Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, OECD Doe.
C(89)1 (Jan. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Resolution 1989] (declaring that progress has
been made in the development of a draft pursuant to the Resolution of the Council on
International Cooperation Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes
of June 20, 1985).
101. Group Proposes Notification Procedures for Transborder Hazardous Waste
Shipments, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 57 (Feb. 11, 1987) [hereinafter Group Proposes
Notification].
102. Pace Slow on Proposed OECD Agreement on Transfrontier Toxic Waste
Movement, II Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 220 (Apr. 13, 1988) [hereinafter Pace Slow].
Prior informed choice requires the exporting nation to advise the importer of the ship-
ment and provides the importer with a period in which to refuse receipt. Id. Prior
notification enables the importing nation to refuse toxic waste shipments only if it has
national laws requiring refusal. Id.; see Group Proposes Notification, supra note 101,
at 57 (discussing the possibility of the OECD's adoption of a prior notification policy
similar to the EC).
103. See OECD Environment Official Optimistic About Accord on Movement of
Toxic Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 116 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter OECD Official
Optimistic] (discussing the various problematic issues that the OECD solved).
104. See Group Proposes Notification, supra note 101, at 57 (discussing the differ-
ent issues presented to the Waste Management Policy Group); see also OECD Official
Optimistic, supra note 103, at 116 (stating that the issue of liability remained one of
the crucial issues to be resolved prior to the Basel Convention); United States Alone in
Seeking to Limit Scope of New OECD System on Waste Movement, 10 Int'l Env't
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recyclable waste should have less stringent notification procedures, in-
cluding a shorter response time.1 5 Finally, the Group feverishly con-
tested the definitions of "hazardous waste" 106 and "adequate disposal
facilities.' ' 7
The OECD finally adopted a number of resolutions and decisions
designed to control the transboundary movement of hazardous waste to
developing countries. 0 8 The OECD will use the EC's core list of haz-
ardous chemicals to resolve the most contentious issue which is the defi-
nition of "hazardous waste."' 0 9 Moreover, a member nation must pro-
Rep. (BNA) 315 (July 8, 1987) [hereinafter U.S. Alone] (discussing the position of the
United States that under the OECD draft, an exporting nation may take legal action
against an exporter who provides false information).
105. See Group Proposes Notification, supra note 101, at 57 (discussing the issues
of the amount of time given to an importing nation to respond to an exporter's notifica-
tion and the result if the importing nation fails to respond in a timely fashion).
106. See OECD System on Transborder Waste Shipments Faces Legal Snags
from U.S., EEC Systems, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 199 (May 13, 1987) (stating that
the United States claimed that the OECD's core list of definitions was overly broad
and could not be enforced under HSWA); U.S. Alone, supra note 104, at 314-15 (dis-
cussing the opposition of many of the OECD member countries to the demand of the
United States to reduce the OECD's core list of wastes); U.S. Position Seen Jeopardiz-
ing Work on Transboundary Waste Shipments, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 371 (Aug.
12, 1987) (noting that the sudden demand of the United States to limit the definition
of hazardous waste was due in large part to the Reagan administration's conclusion
that the American industry's desire to reduce costs should outweigh environmental pro-
tection); U.S. Looking for Acceptable Definition of Hazardous Waste to Enable
Agreement, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 437 (Sept. 9, 1987) (noting the opinion of the
United States that an expansion of the hazardous waste definition would cause heavy
administrative burdens); Pace Slow, supra note 102, at 220 (stating the EC's opinion
that the position of the United States on the definition of hazardous waste was untena-
ble). The EC noted that inherent in international agreements is the demand to "up-
grade internal legislation." Id.; see also Rublack, supra note 9, at 121 (reiterating the
EC's opinion that the objective of global agreements was to "upgrade national legisla-
tion toward a jointly defined standard"); U.S. Alone, supra note 104, at 315 (noting
that at one point, the United States considered "splitting the difference" - the UNEP
would determine what material was "hazardous" and the OECD would determine the
definition for "waste").
107. See OECD Group Makes Progress on Agreement to Control Transfrontier
Shipments of Waste, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 111 (Apr. 9, 1986) [hereinafter OECD
Group Makes Progress] (discussing the difficulty in deciding on a workable definition
of "adequate").
108. See OECD Adopts New Resolution, supra note 1, at 116 (discussing the new
OECD resolution of January 30, 1989); Transfrontier Waste 'A Difficult Issue' Despite
Caracas Conference, Long States, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 377 (July 13, 1988)
[hereinafter Waste 'A Difficult Issue'] (discussing the OECD's May 27, 1988 Final
Decision).
109. See Waste 'A Difficult Issue', supra note 108, at 377 (discussing the OECD's
decision on June 6, 1988 in Caracas, Venezuela); see also Developed, Developing
Countries Disagree Over Elements of Waste Shipment Agreement, 11 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 377 (July 13, 1988) [hereinafter Developed, Developing Countries Disagree]
(acknowledging the OECD's consideration of the core list of hazardous wastes); Reso-
lution 1989, supra note 100, at 1-2 (noting the OECD's adoption of a definition for
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hibit any export of hazardous waste if there is reason to believe that
the waste will not be disposed of in an environmentally sound man-
ner. 110 The OECD, however, fails to require exporting nations to re-
ceive consent from a transit country before shipping the waste."'
Moreover, the OECD decided to leave the issue of liability for a future
international meeting." 2
II. THE BASEL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF
TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL, FINAL ACT
A. THE HISTORY OF THE BASEL CONVENTION
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm"13 recommended the establishment of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). n 4 Initially providing an interna-
both "wastes" and "hazardous wastes"); Rublack, supra note 9, at 121 (noting that the
core list of hazardous wastes consists of wastes which originate from industrial sources
or wastes having particular constituents). Additionally, the OECD's list covers hazard-
ous waste of both the importing and exporting country. Id.
110. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,181 n.179 (citing OECD, Finalization of the
Draft International Agreement on Control of Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous
Wastes (Sept. 5, 1988)) (discussing the proposed provisions of the UNEP and OECD
treaties); see also GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 3 (noting
Greenpeace's and several African nations' criticism of the phrase "environmentally
sound manner" as ambiguous).
11. See Waste 'A Difficult Issue', supra note 108, at 377 (stating that the OECD
Conference in Caracas did not resolve the rights of transit countries); Differences Said
to Remain on Accords Being Developed Separately by OECD. UNEP, 11 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 587 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter Differences Said to Remain] (noting that
although the OECD would require the exporter to send a 15 day notification to both
the importing and transit country, the transit country's tacit consent is presumed if the
time period elapses).
112. See infra note 145 and accompanying text (stating that industrial nations do
not like to consider the issue of liability despite the urging of some of the African
nations).
113. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 10; The United Na-
tions Environment Programme After a Decade: The Nairobi Session of a Special
Character, May 1981, 12 DEN. J. INT'Y L. & PoL'Y 269, 269-70 (1983) [hereinafter
After a Decade: The Nairobi Session]. The United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment at Stockholm gathered together 1,200 delegates from over 400 interna-
tional organizations and 113 countries. Id.; see Stein, The Settlement of Environmental
Disputes: Towards a System of Flexible Dispute Settlement, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 283, 284 (1985) (discussing principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration on the
Human Environment). Principle 21 acknowledges all nations' sovereign right to exploit
domestic resources, but sets forth each nation's responsibility to ensure that activities
conducted within domestic borders do not damage the environment of other countries.
Id. Principle 22 directs nations to cooperate and establish international laws regarding
liability and compensation in the event that a nation's activities cause environmental
harm within another nation. Id. at 285.
114. See Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 784 (stating that the United Nations stab-
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tional mechanism for the exchange of environmental information,"'
UNEP established specific environmental agendas and recommenda-
tions.11 In 1982, UNEP formally decided to tackle the international
transportation and disposal of toxic wastes after an ad hoc working
group of environmental experts met in Montevideo, Paraguay."1
Thereafter, in 1985, UNEP issued the Cairo Guidelines and Principles
for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes.1 "
In June 1987, UNEP established a Draft Convention on the Trans-
boundary Shipment of Hazardous Waste 1 9 and created an ad hoc
lished UNEP to focus on global environmental problems); see also After a Decade:
The Nairobi Session, supra note 113, at 271 (noting that the UNEP consists of a
three-part functional framework: environmental assessment, environmental manage-
ment, and supporting measures). The Environmental Assessment mechanism collects
and reviews scientific data. Id. The environmental management component establishes
goals, consults and coordinates, and examines the practical application of the data com-
piled through the environmental assessment branch. Id. Supporting measures include
education, training, financing, public information and technical coordination. Id.
115. See Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 784 (discussing the role of the United States
in international agreements, including UNEP).
116. See id. (noting the accomplishments of UNEP); see also After a Decade: The
Nairobi Session, supra note 113, at 270 (stating that the UNEP's purpose is to act as
a catalyst which would coordinate and stimulate action on an international level).
117. See Bohte, UNEP's Environmental Law Activity on International Transport
and Disposal of Toxic and Dangerous Wastes, 4 UNEP INDUST. & ENV'T 1, 1 (1983)
(discussing the Conclusions and Recommendations of Montevideo and its Programme
for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law of November 1981).
Two ad hoc meetings of experts laid the foundation for the Montevideo Environmental
Law Programme: (1) developing nations met in Geneva, Switzerland between Septem-
ber 7-9, 1981, and published the Summary of the Deliberations at the Meeting of Ex-
perts of Some Developing Countries on Environmental Law (UNEP/IG.28/3, Annex
IV); and (2) a group of experts on environmental law met between September 9-18,
1981, in Geneva, Switzerland. Id. at 1-2.
118. Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 784 (citing U.N. Environment Programme, U.N.
Doc. EP/WG.122/L.1/Add.3/Rev.1 (1985)); see UNEP, AD Hoc WORKING GROUP
OF LEGAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS WITH A MANDATE TO PREPARE A GLOBAL CON-
VENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES,
UNEP/WG.189/3, Third Session 1 (Nov. 16, 1988) [hereinafter Third Session] (stat-
ing that the UNEP Governing Council approved the Cairo Guidelines and Principles
for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes on June 17, 1987
(UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex II)).
119. Draft Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, UNEP/IG.80/L.4/Add.1-5 (1989) [hereinafter Draft
Convention] (cited in BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 4); see Rublack, supra
note 9, at 122 n.46, 123 n.52, 124 n.55 (noting that the Draft Convention consisted of:
(1) First Revised Draft Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Toxic Wastes (UNEP/WG.182/2); (2) Second Revised Draft Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Toxic Wastes (UNEP/WG.182/3); and (3)
Third Revised Draft Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movements of
Toxic Wastes (UNEP/WG.186/3)); Third Session, supra note 118, at 5-8 (noting that
during the Third Session, the Working Group adopted the Fourth Revised Draft Con-
vention on the Control of the Transboundary Movements of Toxic Wastes); ECE
Called on to Draft Agreement on Transboundary Impact Assessment, 11 Int'l Env't
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working group composed of legal and technical experts (Working
Group). 120 Over the course of five sessions, the Working Group consid-
ered several UNEP revised draft conventions12 1 on the transportation of
toxic wastes and ultimately developed a final recommendation for the
Basel Convention. 22 The Working Group focused less on regulating
the actual physical movements of hazardous wastes across international
borders than on the reduction and safe disposal of toxic wastes. 23 Ac-
cordingly, the Working Group concentrated on specific issues including:
the definitions of waste, 124 liability,1 25 and noncompliance;1 20 assistance
Rep. (BNA) 216 (Apr. 13, 1988) (discussing the UN Economic Commission for Eu-
rope's (ECE) draft of an international environmental impact assessment policy on
transboundary pollution, including transfrontier shipments of hazardous wastes).
120. Third Session, supra note 118, at 1.
121. See Draft Convention, supra note 119 (noting the various conventions); see
also infra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing UNEP and OECD definitions
of hazardous waste as part of draft conventions).
122. See Third Session, supra note 118, at I (noting that the Working Group held
its first session in February 1988 in Geneva, Switzerland; second session in June 1988
in Caracas, Venezuela; and third session in November 1988 in Geneva, Switzerland);
see also UNEP, AD Hoc WORKING GROUP OF LEGAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS WITH
A MANDATE TO PREPARE A GLOBAL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OP TRANS-
BOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, UNEP/WG.190/4, Fourth Session 1
(Feb. 3, 1988) (noting that the Working Group held the fourth session from January
30 to February 3, 1988 in Luxembourg); UNEP, AD Hoc WORKING GROUP OF LE-
GAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS WITH A MANDATE TO PREPARE A GLOBAL CONVENTION
ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, UNEP/
WG.191/5, Fifth Session 1 (Mar. 13, 1989) (noting that the Working Group convened
the fifth Session from March 13 to 17, 1989, in Basel, Switzerland); Waste Shipment
Incidents Spur Interest in UNEP Agreement to Deal with Problem, 11 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 471 (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter Waste Shipment Incidents Spur Interest] (noting
that 40 countries were present at the Caracas meeting and 50 were expected at the
third session in Geneva).
123. See Third Session, supra note 118, at 2-3. The Third session focused on such
measures as: (1) reducing hazardous waste generation, thereby eliminating the neces-
sity of its movement; (2) making receipt of approval for moving hazardous wastes diffi-
cult to obtain, and permitting movement only when it is environmentally safe to dispose
of it outside of the origin, and (3) ensuring that the shipment is internationally trans-
ported under the highest standards of environmental safety. Id.
124. See Third Session, supra note 118, at 3 (discussing the importance of clearly
defining the wastes that the Convention should have as its concern); see also UNEP
Working Group Reaches Agreement on Question of 'Prior Informed Consent', 1 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 165 (Mar. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Working Group Reaches Agree-
ment] (discussing the need for future negotiations concerning the adoption of the
OECD's core list of hazardous wastes).
125. Third Session, supra note 118, at 3; see U.N. International Law Commission
Split on Transboundary Pollution Liability, I I lnt'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 166 (Mar. 9,
1988) (discussing that although some industrialized nations oppose strict liability, de-
veloping countries demand that multinational corporations be held strictly liable for
inherently dangerous activities).
126. See Third Session, supra note 118, at 3 (listing compensation, monitoring fa-
cilities, and state's responsibilities as recurring central issues that the Convention
should address).
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to developing nations regarding the notification and testing of toxic
shipments; 117 environmentally sound receiving facilities;12 8 emergency
responses; 129 illegal trafficking of toxic waste; 30 criteria for the permit
and approval of disposal facilities; 3' and lack of adequate infrastruc-
ture within developing countries.1
2
B. ADOPTIONS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION
The Draft Convention adopted the OECD's 13 3 core list of wastes
134
and hazardous characteristics. 35 The members of the Draft Convention
hoped that the core list would resolve the dilemma created by two com-
peting interests: the industrialized nations' exclusive regulations which
did not include certain materials in the definition of "hazardous
waste," and the developing countries' demand for a comprehensive defi-
nition of "hazardous waste."'' 36
The Draft Convention set forth two lists noting potential recycling
operations, 137 and required that specific information be included both in
the notification' 38 and transport documents. 39 Furthermore, the ex-
127. Id.
128. See Working Group Reaches Agreement, supra note 124, at 165 (noting that
the Working Group must deliberate the issues of disposal sites and methods of disposal
at the Caracas meeting).
129. Third Session, supra note 118, at 3.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see Waste Shipments Incidents Spur Interest, supra note 122, at 471 (dis-
cussing the desires of developing nations for technical guidance in the treatment and
disposal of waste).
133. See Rublack, supra note 9, at 122 (stating that unlike the OECD, however,
the UNEP included transit countries' legislation in its definition of hazardous wastes);
see also Waste 'A Difficult Issue', supra note 108, at 377 (noting the introduction of
the OECD's core list at the UNEP meeting in Caracas, Venezuela).
134. Fifth Revised Draft Convention [on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes], UNEP/WG.189/3, Annex I [hereinafter Fifth Revised
Draft Convention]. The core list, however, expressly excluded radioactive waste. Id.
Annex I, at 4. A waste which is not covered in the core list, can be considered "hazard-
ous" if included in the domestic legislation of the exporter, importer, or transit country.
Id.
135. Id. annex II at 58.
136. Developed, Developing Countries Disagree, supra note 109, at 376.
137. Fifth Revised Draft Convention, supra note 134, annex I at 61; see id. annex
III at 60 (noting operations which do not lead to resource recovery, recycling, reclama-
tion, direct re-use, or alternative uses).
138. Id. annex IV at 62. The pre-notification information required to be provided
includes: the names of the exporter, transit nations, and importer, and their respective
competent authorities; the date of export, the time period over which the waste will be
exported, and a proposed itinerary; insurance information; physical and composite
description of the waste; the method of disposal; and information from the disposer
indicating that the waste will be disposed in an environmentally sound manner and in
accordance with the importer's domestic laws. Id.
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porter must notify any nation involved in the transport of the waste and
receive the consent of the importing country.1 40 Finally, the Convention
would only permit the transport if the exporter has received satisfac-
tory information that the importing nation has adequate technical ca-
pacity for disposal.141
The Draft Convention failed, however, to address several issues.
Rather than require an exporter to receive a transit country's prior in-
formed consent, the Convention decided that a transit nation's lack of
response should be interpreted as tacit approval. 142 Moreover, the Draft
Convention neglected to articulate the extent to which an exporter is
obligated to make technical assessments of the importer's disposal facil-
ities. 43 Accordingly, the issue of national sovereignty remains un-
resolved.14 4 In addition, the Draft Convention did not address the issue
139. Id. annex IV at 64. The information movement document required the inclu-
sion of "certification of receipt at the designated disposal facility and indication of the
approximate date of disposal." Id.
140. Rublack, supra note 9, at 122; see Working Group Reaches Agreement, supra
note 124, at 165 (discussing the successful breakthrough in negotiations regarding prior
informed consent).
141. Rublack, supra note 9, at 123-24; see Third Session, supra note 118, at 14
(requiring that each party to the agreement export hazardous wastes from its borders
in a way that is as "environmentally sound" as waste disposal within its borders); De-
veloped, Developing Countries Disagree, supra note 109, at 376 (reporting that the
head of the toxic chemicals program of UNEP believes that inspection and verification
mechanisms will ensure proper and safe disposal). Developing countries are also press-
ing for a technological transfer mechanism whereby industrialized nations will assist
Third World countries in the construction and maintenance of disposal facilities. Id.
142. Rublack, supra note 9, at 123 (discussing the Third Draft Convention's allo-
cation of duties to provide information to the receiving country); see Waste Shipment
Incidents Spur Interest, supra note 122, at 472 (noting the disagreement on informed
consent for transit countries that existed between the industrialized countries and Third
World nations, represented by the Group 77, a group of over 100 developing countries);
Delegates of 50 Countries Fail to Agree on Draft Covering Movement of Toxic Waste,
12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 49 (Feb. 8, 1989) (discussing the failure to reach a consen-
sus on the issue of a transit country's prior consent and the developing nations' determi-
nation to block any convention which does not include such consent); Western, African
Nations Fail to Agree on Transboundary Movement of Toxic Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 49 (Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Western, African Nations Fail to Agree]
(noting that although prior notification must be given to a transit nation and the transit
nation may then object within a reasonable time, agreement has not yet been reached
on whether silence means tacit consent); Developed, Developing Countries Disagree,
supra note 109, at 376 (noting that although Third World countries may agree to a
time limit regarding a transit country's objection to a shipment of waste passing
through its borders, they oppose the idea that the failure to respond in time means tacit
consent to the shipment). The developing countries assert that the absence of a reply
should be assumed to be an objection. Id.
143. Rublack, supra note 9, at 124; see Waste Shipment Incidents Spur Interest,
supra note 122, at 471 (noting that Third World nations prefer technological assistance
in waste disposal rather than a United Nations police force verifying proper disposal).
144. Rublack, supra note 9, at 124.
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of liability, reserving it instead for a future international forum. 45 Fi-
nally, the Draft Convention failed to specifically define terms which are
critically important for adequate enforcement, i.e., "adequate technical
capacity for disposal", "environmentally sound management of hazard-
ous waste", and "reason to believe."'14 The ambiguity of these concepts
foreshadowed the Basel Convention's deliberations and dissensions.
C. THE BASEL CONVENTION ON THE TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS
OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL
1. Introduction
On March 22, 1989, after two years of intense and divisive debate,147
thirty-four nations 48 signed the Basel Convention.149 The purpose of
145. Id. at 124 n.60 (citing Recommendation No. VII of the OECD Conference on
International Cooperation Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous
Wastes, in OECD Resolution C (85)100 5 (1985)); see Western, African Nations Fail
To Agree, supra note 142, at 50 (noting that although Nigeria pressed the Fourth
Draft Convention to address the issue of liability, industrialized nations prefered to
delay deliberation). But see OECD Extends Polluter Pays Principle to Include Costs
ofIndustrial Accidents, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 380 (Aug. 1989) (discussing Reso-
lution C(89)88 which demands that operators of waste facilities reimburse public au-
thorities for costs incurred in preventing, controlling, or cleaning up pollution which
accidentally occurred within their installations). The new resolution also requires oper-
ators to restore the damaged environment. Id. The OECD further noted that member
governments should not use subsidies or tax advantages to facilitate the polluter's abil-
ity to bear pollution control costs. Id. Member nations may tax or impose fees on facili-
ties that are inherently hazardous and use the proceeds to control and prevent acciden-
tal pollution. Id.
146. Third Session, supra note 118, art. IV(4)(g), at 11; see Handley, supra note
4, at 10,181 n.176 (noting that the Third Draft Convention prevents nations from ex-
porting hazardous wastes, especially to developing countries, if there is "reason to be-
lieve" that the hazardous wastes will not be "managed in an environmentally sound
manner"); Fifth Revised Draft Convention, supra note 134, annex I at 1 (noting that
because the Working Group feared that a more detailed annex would not be completed
in time for the Basel Convention, it recommended during the Third Session the crea-
tion of an annex that would generally define "environmentally sound manner"). Ac-
cordingly, the Fifth Revised Draft Convention defined "environmentally sound man-
agement of hazardous wastes" as the "management of wastes so as to prevent
[appreciable] [significant] harm to human health and the environment." Id. art. 1(7),
annex I at 6. However, the words "appreciable" and "significant" contained within the
bracketed material are alternative words which were to be considered at a later date.
Id. at n.5; see also Western, African Nations Fail to Agree, supra note 142, at 50
(discussing what criteria should be employed for approval of disposal facilities as "envi-
ronmentally sound").
147. Tuohy, 100 Nations Striving to Agree on Pact to Curb Toxic Waste Exports,
L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at 9 (discussing that although more than 100 nations had
been negotiating for 18 months, many nations were still objecting to parts of the draft
for the Basel Convention).
148. Thirty-Four Countries Sign Convention on Transport, Disposal of Hazardous
Wastes, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 159 (Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Thirty-Four
Countries Sign Convention]; see GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53,
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the Basel Convention is to enhance the control of the transfrontier
movement of toxic wastes in order to encourage safe management and
reduction in volume of transboundary shipments. 1 °0 The Basel Conven-
tion has yet to be implemented, however, because the required twenty
nations have not ratified its provisions. 151 Many nations view the Basel
Convention as signaling the international community's commitment to
protect both human health and the world environment.5 2 Proponents
suggest that the Basel Convention, suggest proponents and envelops a
larger global community than previous international agreements,
thereby resulting in implementation on a larger economic and political
scale.'53 Supporters further contend that the Basel Convention qualita-
tively expands and improves on the presently existing international and
regional agreements which attempt to control the transfrontier move-
at 2 (noting that although 116 nations endorsed the Basel Convention, only 34 coun-
tries signed: (1) Western Europe-Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the European Community Commission; (2) Eastern Eu-
rope-Hungary; (3) North America-Canada; (4) Latin America-Bolivia, Columbia,
Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela; (5) Middle
East-Afghanistan, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and
United Arab Emirates; and (6) Asia/South Pacific-Philippines). Neither the United
States nor any African nations signed the Basel Convention. Id.; Thirty-Four Coun-
tries Sign Convention, supra, (stating that unlike signatures of the Basel Convention,
endorsements do not have the equivalent binding authority).
149. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11; see Cody, 105 Nations Back Treaty on
Toxic-Waste Shipping, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1989, at 12 (stating that the Basel Con-
vention represented a compromise between developed countries which preferred flexibil-
ity for safe exports of toxic wastes, and Third World nations that sought a complete
ban on transfrontier movements of waste); Abrahams, Treaty on Disposal of Hazard-
ous Waste Agreed, Fin. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at 3 (quoting the British Minister of
State for the Environment that the Basel Convention is seen as the "first stepping stone
on the road forward").
150. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 39.
151. Thirty-Four Countries Sign Convention, supra note 148, at 160; see GREEN-
PEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 2 (describing "ratification" as mean-
ing "being incorporated into national law"); Abrahams, supra note 149, at 3 (stating
that the process of gathering 20 signatures to ratify the Basel Convention could take
almost two years); UPDATE, supra note 83, at 2 (noting that Argentina and Portugal
have recently joined the Basel agreement and Jordan has become the first nation to
ratify it).
152. Tuohy, supra note 147, at 6.
153. See id. (noting other regional and international organizations that have ad-
dressed the commerce of toxic waste). The Basel Convention's preamble strongly im-
plies that although regional agreements are beneficial, a global convention will provide
greater incentive to control shipments of hazardous waste and implement safeguards.
BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at I; see also Marshall, supra note 8, at 10 (dis-
cussing that the purpose of the Basel Convention is to expand and improve regional
agreements); Tuohy, 116 Nations Adopt Treaty on Toxic Waste, L.A. Times, Mar. 23,
1989, at 6 (noting that although the Basel Convention has not stopped the commerce of
toxic waste, it has signalled an international commitment to prevent the danger that
toxic wastes pose to the global environment and human health).
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ments of hazardous waste. Several international environmental organi-
zations and most developing countries, on the other hand, believe the
Basel Convention is laden with ambiguities and loopholes.1"4 Opponents
point to the Convention's ambiguous language and the exclusion of fun-
damental and important concepts.' 55 They assert that the Basel Con-
vention does not restrict the transboundary shipment of hazardous
waste; instead, it merely' provides a global tracking system for toxic
waste movement. 56 Accordingly, critics contend the Basel Convention
grants industrialized nations formal permission to use developing na-
tions as dumping grounds for their hazardous wastes.5 7 Finally, critics
charge that the Basel Convention simply reiterates the existing, yet in-
adequate international toxic waste agreements. 158 As evidence, oppo-
nents note that the Basel Convention does not include important
amendments proposed by several Third World countries. 59
154. GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 2-3.
155. Id.; see supra note 1.54 and infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (re-
viewing developing nations' and international environmental organizations' various
complaints).
156. GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 3.
157. See Thirty-Four Countries Sign Convention, supra note 148, at 160 (stating
that the President of the OAU declared that unless African nations' interests are se-
cured, they would not ratify the Basel Convention); GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UP-
DATE, supra note 53, at 3 (reiterating the contention that the Basel Convention actu-
ally reinforces irresponsible dumping of toxic wastes on the Third World); Tuohy,
supra note 147, at 6 (describing developing nations' fear that unless a complete ban is
implemented, corrupt Third World governments will accept hazardous waste in ex-
change for large payments); Abrahams, supra note 149, at 6 (discussing the fact that
many developing nations' proposed amendments were not included in the Basel Con-
vention); Cody, supra note 149, at 32 (stating a Greenpeace observer's view that the
Basel Convention provided the industrial nations with the opportunity to protect haz-
ardous waste trade, not the environment). Shortly after the Basel Convention, Green-
peace activists unfurled a large banner opposite the conference center which read,
"[D]anger. Basel Convention Legalizes Toxic Terror". Id.; see also Thirty-Four Coun-
tries Sign Convention, supra note 148, at 161 (noting Greenpeace's criticism that the
United States believes it is not required to protect less developed nations to the same
degree as its own citizens and, consequently, is engaging in "immoral exploitation of
• . . politics and poverty.").
158. GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 3.
159. See Thirty-Four Countries Sign Convention, supra note 148, at 160 (stating
that the excluded amendments proposed by the Third World countries include: (1)
generating countries would be liable for the ultimate disposal of their waste, (2) the
importation of wastes would be prohibited if the receiving nation did not have the same
mechanisms for disposal as the exporting country, and (3) the adoption-verification
procedures implemented would include United Nations officials inspecting the disposal
site); see also Abrahams, supra note 149, at 3 (noting that the amendments were re-
jected after pressures from Western industrialized countries).
[VOL. 5:393
1990] HAZARDOUS WASTE AND THE THIRD WORLD 417
2. Content and Analysis
The Basel Convention adopts the core list of hazardous wastes from
the EC and OECD lists. 6 ' The breadth and depth of the core list cre-
ates a dependable and encompassing framework which is necessary for
nations to successfully implement the Convention's provisions.101 The
Basel Convention, however, excludes radioactive wastes from its
scope. 162 Supporters of the Convention point to the United Nations In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) existing regulations
which control the shipment of radioactive hazardous wastes. 16 3 The
IAEA, however, does not cover the transboundary shipment of nonfis-
sile radioactive wastes.'"
In addition, the Basel Convention grants the nations of import and
transit the right to require the exporter to insure the toxic waste ship-
ment. 65 Although the Convention's insurance provision could furnish
developing nations with greater bargaining power, its effectiveness is
questionable because the Convention currently lacks a liability
provision.1
66
The Basel Convention also requires exporting nations to reimport
hazardous waste if they cannot make alternative arrangements for dis-
posal. 67 The provision covering the reimportation of illegal waste, how-
ever, contains a loophole.'" 8 Article 9 requires the exporting nation to
reimport an illegal shipment of waste within thirty days.0 9 The export-
ing country, however, can avoid reimportation if it determines that to
do so would be "impracticable."' 7 If the exporting nation determines
that reimportation is impracticable, the Convention requires only that
160. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note I1, at 41, 78-79.
161. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing the goals and ben-
efits of the adoption of the OECD's core list of wastes and hazardous characteristics).
162. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, art. 1(3), at 41.
163. Thirty-Four Countries Sign Convention, supra note 148, at 161.
164. See GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 3 (reiterating the
absence of nonfissile radioactive wastes in the Basel Convention).
165. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, art. 6(l1), at 50.
166. See id. art. 12, at 57 (stating that the Convention parties shall cooperate to
adopt a protocol defining rules and procedures governing liability and compensation as
soon as practicable); see also id. at 39 (noting that nations are "liable in accordance to
international law" for the fulfillment of their obligations to protect the global environ-
ment and human health); supra notes 52, 77, 112 and accompanying text (noting that
the United States, the EC, and the OECD presently do not have any liability provi-
sions). But see Handley, supra note 4, at 10,176-77 (noting the EC's new proposal
which would implement strict liability on generators of toxic waste).
167. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, art. 8, at 52.
168. Id. art. 9(2), at 53.
169. Id. art. (2)(a).
170. Id. art. 9(3), at 63.
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it dispose of the waste in an "environmentally sound manner. 1 7 ' Thus,
the ambiguity in these standards may allow industrialized nations to
avoid the requirement of reimportation.1'"
In addition, Article 9 appears to contain a double standard.'7" While
the exporting nation has two options if the exporter's conduct results in
an illegal shipment, an importing nation has only one option when an
importer's or disposer's conduct is illegal. 174 The importing nation must
dispose of the illegal shipment in an "environmentally sound man-
ner." 17 Consequently, an importing nation is subject to frontal assaults
from both sides on the issue. An exporting nation can dispose of illegal
toxic waste in the importing country if reimportation is "impractica-
ble," and the Convention requires the importing nation to dispose of
any illegally imported waste.176 Moreover, this double standard may
encourage illegal importation of hazardous waste since the illegal im-
porter may rely on the Article 9 requirement, which obligates the im-
porting nation to dispose of illegally accepted toxic waste.'7 Although
a number of Third World countries have enacted laws which severely
penalize any party who illegally imports toxic waste,'" these same na-
tions often lack the adequate infrastructure and resources to enforce
their domestic laws.'
79
The Basel Convention duplicates as well as expands the EC and
OECD notification and consent requirements. The exporting country
must notify the authorized competent authorities within the nations of
171. Id.
172. See GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 2 (noting that
exporters have the discretion not to re-import illegal waste).
173. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, art. 4(8), at 46; see supra notes 169, 171




176. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text (comparing the exporter's dis-
cretion to re-import illegally exported toxic waste and the importing nation's duty to
dispose of illegally imported hazardous waste).
177. Id.
178. See GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 5 (noting the
African Trade Union Unity's call on African nations to severely punish any importers
of toxic wastes); see also Greenpeace, Developments in National Politics, GREENPEACE
TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 1, 1989, at 3 (noting that Nigeria has outlawed the "purchase,
sale, import, transport, and storage" of hazardous waste). Any person convicted of haz-
ardous waste dumping will receive life imprisonment. Id.
179. See Rublack, supra note 9, at 115 (noting developing nations' lack of adminis-
trative structures and legislation to specifically control the environmental risks of haz-
ardous waste disposal); see also Handley, supra note 4, at 10,182 (discussing whether
consent is truly consent, because Third World nations lack the necessary scientific and
institutional infrastructures to develop policies to manage toxic waste); infra notes 209-
11 and accompanying text (discussing developing nations' fragile political systems).
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import and transit of the proposed shipment of hazardous wastes.' 80
The Convention also requires that specific information accompany both
the shipment of waste"1" and the exporter's notification.182 In addition,
the exporting nation must secure the consent of the state of transit and
the importing country.'
83
The Basel Convention also compels the exporting country to obtain
confirmation of the contract between the exporter and the importing
country, which verifies that the importing country will dispose of the
hazardous waste in an "environmentally sound manner."' 8' The appli-
cable article, however, contains several vague terms which may enable
countries to disregard the article's requirements. 8" For example, the
Basel Convention requires the importing nation to have "adequate dis-
posal facilities,"' 86 and prohibits export if the exporting country has a
"reason to believe" that the toxic waste will not be "managed in an
environmentally sound manner."' 87 The Convention further urges the
participants to extend aid to developing nations for the development of
disposal facilities."88
The Basel Convention also seeks to address the origin of the trans-
frontier shipment of toxic wastes.' 89 The Convention requires nations to
periodically review efforts to reduce hazardous waste production, espe-
cially with regard to those toxic wastes that are commonly shipped to
Third World nations. 9' Additionally, the Basel Convention provides a
list of specific operations which nations may use to produce evidence of
legitimate recycling.' 9 ' The list acts as an enforcement mechanism be-
cause it prevents nations from attempting to ship toxic wastes under
the guise of recyclable materials.9 2
Finally, the Basel Convention permits the establishment of bilateral
or multilateral agreements between a party and a nonparty. 9 3 The pro-
vision, however, fails to thoroughly articulate the scope of these alter-
180. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, art. 6(1), at 53.
181. Id. annex VB, at 88.
182. Id. annex VA, at 85.
183. Id. art. 6(4), at 49.
184. Id. art. 6(3)(b).
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id. art. 4(2)(b), at 45.
187. Id. art. 4(2)(g), at 46.
188. Id. art. 10(2)(c), 10(3), at 55.
189. Id. art. 4(13), at 47.
190. Id.
191. Id. annex IV at 83-84 (listing operations which do and do not lead to the
possibility of resource recovery, recycling, reclamations, direct re-use or alternative
uses).
192. Id.
193. Id. art. 11(1), at 56.
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native agreements. It says only that accords established independent of
the Basel Convention must contain provisions that conform to the Con-




The transboundary movement of hazardous wastes should be banned.
International environmental problems are not restricted to one nation's
land, air, space, or water. Each nation's policies and pollution affect
another nation's health. The hazardous waste problem cannot be
played as if it were a chess game. 195 Thus far, regional and interna-
tional agreements reflect strategies of gamesmanship, as each nation
maneuvers to checkmate the other.'
The Basel Convention reflects most industrial nations' strategy to
checkmate developing nations into accepting hazardous waste exports.
Under such terms as "prior informed consent," "environmentally sound
manner," and "adequate disposal activities," the Basel Convention has
legitimized the international toxic waste game and proclaimed indus-
trial nations the winners.
Supporters of the Convention maintain that developing countries
benefit from the jobs, income, business activity, and technological edu-
cation associated with the transboundary waste business. 197 The poten-
tial benefits of education and employment, however, are mere short
term gains and apply only to the limited market of waste importa-
tion.198 More importantly, those who seek to protect these benefits are
not challenging the fundamental bipolar economic inequities that force
Third World nations to accept shipments of toxic waste.19 Developing
countries acquiesce to the importation of hazardous wastes because
they are poor and have unequal bargaining power.2 00 Consequently, the
194. Id.; see also GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 3 (sug-
gesting that bilateral or multilateral agreements need not conform to the Basel Conven-
tion's provisions).
195. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,182 (analogizing the present solution to the
toxic waste problem to a shell game in which wastes are moved around the world).
196. Id. (noting that any solutions other than a ban constitute half-way measures).
197. See Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 788 (suggesting that if the United States
banned exports of hazardous waste totally, the ban would harm developing countries by
eliminating benefits like jobs and technological education).
198. Id.
199. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,182 (noting that the existing legal mecha-
nisms do not address the heart of the problem of toxic waste commerce, which is "the
economic force that drives hazardous waste ... to seek the country with the least costly
disposal requirements.").
200. See generally J. VALLETTE, supra note 2, at 15-44 (discussing various schemes
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toxic waste trade between industrialized nations and the Third World
resembles economic blackmail.2 0' Only the Third World's complete ban
of toxic waste imports will challenge industrialized nations to confront
the uncontrolled generation of hazardous waste.202 Therefore, the true
aim regarding hazardous waste management is to minimize waste gen-
eration and develop new recycling methods.20 3
Industrialized countries should expend the revenue necessary to ade-
quately prevent waste generation, or dispose of domestic waste within
their own borders.20 4 If an industrialized country does not have the
topographical capacity to dispose of waste, it should rely on multilat-
eral or bilateral treaties with other industrialized nations to resolve its
waste problem. Unlike developing countries, industrialized nations have
the economic, political, and technological infrastructures to manage
hazardous waste movement and disposal.
Because many developing nations will be unable to ignore the poten-
tial revenue, the transboundary shipment of toxic wastes to developing
countries may be an unavoidable reality.20 5 Therefore, the Basel Con-
vention must be amended to clarify its terms and improve its enforce-
ment mechanisms. First, instead of relinquishing the definition of terms
to the parties' subjective discretion, the Basel Convention should be
amended to clearly define these terms.20 6 On a macro scale, the Basel
Convention should either completely prohibit agreements which are in-
of hazardous waste commerce).
201. See Rublack, supra note 9, at 115 (stating that the deliberate exploitation of
differences between environmental requirements in developed and Third World nations
results in the sacrifice of long-term environmental health in exchange for foreign ex-
change earnings).
202. See Pollock, supra note 34, at 9 (noting that in 1980 the city of New York
generated 1.80 kilograms of waste per capita per day, and Tokyo generated 1.38 kilo-
grams per capita per day, as compared to Tunis, Tunisia with only 0.56 kilograms and
Kano, Nigeria with 0.46 kilograms per capita per day).
203. See id. at 16-17 (describing the advantages of waste to energy plants). Ac-
cording to Pollock, "intelligent plastics," which are biodegradable plastics, are the wave
of the future because they can replace nonbiodegradable packaging materials and thus
reduce waste. Id. at 12.
204. See Postel, supra note 33, at 37 (describing advanced technologies in the
Netherlands and West Germany that have prevented most domestic hazardous wastes
from entering the environment). In the Netherlands, only about one-quarter of all
waste, most of which consists of nontoxic materials, is placed into landfills. Id. at 38. In
West Germany, government subsidies help reduce the cost of hazardous disposal. Id.;
see also Handley, supra note 4, at 10,182 (stating that the Office of Technology As-
sessment in 1987 concluded that at least half of the toxic waste generated in the
United States could be eradicated in a few years using currently available technology).
205. See Tuohy, supra note 147, at 9 (noting that it may be two years before the
requisite 20 countries ratify the Basel Convention).
206. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (noting the ambiguity in the
Basel Convention's terminology).
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dependent of the Basel Convention or clearly define the scope and
terms of independent bilateral agreements.
Definitional clarification would likely result in industrialized nations
bearing a heavier financial burden of implementing more specific safe-
guards.2 01 Because industrialized countries generate most of the world's
hazardous waste, equity as well as the dangerous long term environ-
mental repercussions demand that these countries carry the greater fi-
nancial responsibility. 08 Moreover, to a greater extent than in industri-
alized nations, factionalism, patron-client relationships, and corruption
influence environmental decisions in Third World countries. 09 Because
developing countries' executive branches often control bureaucratic
mechanisms,21 0 implementation of environmental legislation is typically
unsuccessful. Furthermore, developing nations' single-party political
systems invariably dominate the judiciaries.211 Accordingly, developing
countries' judiciaries are commonly not autonomous decisionmakers,
and therefore cannot ensure that the government is properly imple-
menting legislation.212 Therefore, it would be a grave mistake to burden
Third World nations with the initiation, implemention, and enforce-
ment of toxic waste laws.
Because international environmental emergencies such as Bhopa 2 13
are apt to occur with more frequency, establishing a framework of
proper distribution of liability is also crucial.21 4 Therefore, the Basel
Convention should be amended to provide equitable obligations of lia-
bility and compensation. One possibility is the establishment of a fund
which would assist nations in the event of an international emergency
arising from the transport or disposal of hazardous wastes. 10 Financial
contributions to the fund could be based on each nation's pro rata share
of hazardous waste generation and exportation.
207. See Helfenstein, supra note 9, at 789 (stating that the developing nation's
disposal facility should meet the same standards of operation, management, and worker
protection as the exporting country's waste facilities).
208. Id. at 790 (stating that if the costs of safe disposal are paid in advance, the
issues of liability and compensation will rarely arise).
209. Leonard & Morell, supra note 13, at 307.
210. Id. at 308.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See India Gas Disaster Toll Soars, L.A. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at Al; Gas
Leak Kills 395 in India, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1984, at Al; Hazarika, Gas Leak in India
Kills at Least 410 in City of Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989, at Al.
214. See Handley, supra note 4, at 10,176 (noting the EC's recent discussions con-
cerning the implementation of strict liability provisions).
215. BASEL CONVENTION, supra note 11, art. 14(2), at 60 (requiring parties to
consider the establishment of a fund). The Basel Convention, however, fails to address
emergency funding by nonparties. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Basel Convention attempts to achieve the grand feat of assem-
bling over one hundred diverse nations with varying objectives in order
to build a consensus on an extremely divisive issue. Control of the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, however, increasingly ap-
pears to be an oxymoron. Despite the existence of EC, OECD, and
United States regulations, toxic waste continues to be shipped both le-
gally and illegally.2 16 Although developing nations are beginning to ban
imports of toxic wastes, shipments will continue to find ports of hold
due to the lucrative profits Third World countries receive in return for
storing toxic waste. Moreover, developing nations do not have the infra-
structure or resources to realistically ensure safe disposal or handling of
toxic waste. Nor do developing countries have the financial resources to
place the issue of hazardous waste importation high on their priority
lists. As Indira Ghandi said, "How can we speak to those who live in
the villages and in the slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers, and
the air clean? Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?" '217
Fundamentally, therefore, the issue of exportation of toxic waste to the
Third World is thoroughly grounded in the existing global economic
structure. Until this global economic inequity is resolved, wealth will
continue to permit industrialized nations to proclaim "Not In My
Backyard."
216. See J. VALLETrE, supra note 2, at 15-133 (describing cases of illegal toxic
waste shipping); see also GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 53, at 3
(quoting a well known international trader who said that the Basel Convention's re-
quirements would not prevent him from shipping waste).
217. Leonard & Morell, supra note 13, at 282 (quoting A. MILLER, A PLANET TO
CHOOSE 49 (1978)).
